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Abstract
This paper aims to present an extension of the ICES model to capture the public sector. Departing
from a demand system mainly derived from the GTAP model, ICES-XPS model disentangles the
private and the public actors. The paper reviews the changes in both the database and the model
equations following the existing literature and considering the availability of data as well. The
model is then tested with a series of simple experiments to highlight its contribution to economic
analysis in which the public sector may play an important role. Finally, we show the flexibility in
the closure rule of the public sector that allows addressing different policy research questions.
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1. Introduction
Public policy challenges are diverse and pursue a variety of aims. Its objectives can range from
fostering economic development and reduce poverty, to mitigating the negative environmental
externalities, as well as providing a social welfare system. Given the diversity of objectives, there
are also plenty of instruments that can be used to pursue a specific policy target, which should
also be evaluated prior to its implementation since it will affect the public budget balance, and
therefore its sustainability. In this context, there are two important public policy challenges which
are apparently unrelated in the short-run but will definitely have intertwined implications for the
long-run. The first one regards climate policy addressing long-run targets entailing a shift to a low
carbon economy and the need to adapt to a future climate. The second one refers to public
budget and debt evolution which has recently gained attention due to the financial crisis as well as
the growing levels of indebtedness in many countries.
However, at the political level some concerns exist regarding possible trade-offs between
environmental taxes and the need to foster the economic growth; or environmental public
expenditure along with scarce public resources. Although these fears may be well intentioned they
may not be well founded since it is necessary to consider several interrelated elements to perform
a proper assessment. For this purpose this paper aims at extending a global Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) model, the Intertemporal Computable Equilibrium System (ICES) (Eboli et al.,
2009; Parrado and De Cian, 2014), by enhancing the representation of the public sector in order to
address the indirect effects of climate change policies and impacts on public budget. This will
provide an improved tool (ICES- XPS)1 for policy assessment which will shade additional insights for
policy design and implementation.
The choice of a CGE model is because this type of framework has been increasingly used to
evaluate both climate change impacts as well as policies since it provides economy-wide
assessments with a detailed sectoral and regional aggregation. Furthermore, this instrument
allows considering indirect effects via changes in consumption or investment patterns.
However, including a public sector in a global CGE through the formalization of a government
agent is a challenging theoretical and empirical issue. Difficulties arise from data collection for a
wide number of countries, since information is not always available, and addressing lack of data
sometimes requires simplifying assumptions. Consequently, the modelling choices are also forced
to follow those assumptions, reducing the role of the public sector despite its importance to allow
for a more detailed representation of the rest of the economy. This is mainly due to data gathering
and harmonization processes. It is very difficult to collect data for several countries as in the GTAP
database and then assemble a single and consistent global database. For instance, the GTAP
model (Hertel, 1997), the most worldwide used global CGE model, considers the existence of a
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ICES- XPS stands for ICES model with eXtended Public Sector.
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regional household which is composed of three final demand components, namely private
consumption, government consumption and savings. They are linked each other via a CobbDouglas function which in turn means a fixed share among these three components. The main
drawback of this formulation is that there is no direct link between government expenditures and
tax revenues (Hertel, 1997).
There are not many studies addressing climate policies along with their possible effects on public
budgets in a general equilibrium framework. As Osbergahaus and Reif (2010) argue, most of the
analysis in terms of “fiscal” and “budgetary” effects of adaptation strategies has been pursued
without using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models and without assessing the indirect
effects resulting from forgone profits or responses on consumption after a change in investment
and consumption behaviour.
CGE models have been mainly used to evaluate the effects of climate policy on the public budget.
Olmos et al. (2011) use a CGE model (GEM-E3) coupled with an energy system model for the EU
(PRIMES) to assess the public budget position and the fiscal direct effects related to a low-carbon
economy transition in EU member states. Reducing carbon emissions via a carbon tax may have
beneficial effects on the fiscal position due to the increase in public revenues (namely revenues
form carbon pricing), although other policies increasing public expenses, such as increasing direct
investments (to promote low-carbon technology development) or transfer payments, may worsen
the fiscal position. These are fiscal direct effects which mostly affect the public budget, but there
are other notable indirect effects, such as changes in state revenues and expenditures due to
impacts of climate policy on economic activities. Another CGE application is the phasing-out of
fossil fuel subsidies which could alleviate the pressure on public budget as well as reduce fossil
fuel consumption and emissions (Burniaux and Chateau, 2011). Other examples include McKibbin
(2012) which focuses on the potential positive effects of carbon pricing on the government budget
and comparing different options of carbon tax recycling in the USA. In addition, most of the CGE
models which contemporaneously address both aspects are single country models (e.g. World
Bank, 2010).2
This paper describes how the government may be introduced in a general equilibrium framework.
Section 2 presents a literature review about the representation of the public sector in global CGE
models. Section 3 focuses on the extension of the database to improve the description of
government budget accounts. Section 4 explains how the government allocates its income
between expenditures and savings, since in a recursive dynamic framework, there is also the need
for a within- and between- period specification. Section 5 presents the evolution over time of the
debt stocks and interest payments. Section 6 discusses different closure rules for the public sector,
presenting in a simplified framework alternatives on how to treat government budget. Section 7
considers some simple experiments to test the extended model. Finally, section 8 concludes.
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The World Bank report is about the economics of adaptation to climate change in which five single country studies
are performed with CGE models: Vietnam, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Bangladesh.
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2. Representation of the public sector in global CGE models
The main stream of global CGE models stem from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). As it is
described in Hertel (1997), the GTAP model does not consider explicitly a government institution.
In its database, we can find different types of taxes plus government consumption, but no
government savings (McDonald and Thierfelder, 2004). The focus of the model is mainly on trade
relationships across countries rather than different institutions within each country. In fact, there
is no income split between the private household and the government. A representative agent in
each region holds indiscriminately income from both primary factors and tax revenues. Regional
income use is modelled according to a Cobb-Douglas function that allocates it among three final
components (i.e. private consumption, public consumption, and savings) according to constant
shares. The choice of this functional form is the main drawback of the model for the proper
representation of the government agent. According to Hertel (1997): “cutting taxes by no means
implies a reduction in government expenditures in the GTAP model. Indeed, to the extent that
these tax cuts lead to a reduction in excess burden, regional real income will increase and real
government expenditure will likely also rise”. However, there is a clear motivation for this
modelling choice as the GTAP data have incomplete coverage of tax instruments in each region.
Furthermore, the greatest advantage of this formulation is the existence of a unique welfare
indicator derived from the regional utility function (Hertel1997). It considers welfare out of
private, public consumption and savings together.
Further developments to introduce an explicit government institution can be recapped in three
main strands. Firstly, there are models that split the regional income, and savings according to a
differentiated household and government (e.g., GLOBE, McDonald et al., 2007). This means an
income allocation according to its ownership (i.e. endowment repayment to household, and tax
revenues to government). Household and government savings are derived as residuals. In this case
the only source of government income is tax revenue while expenditures are limited to the
consumption of goods and services.
Secondly, another group of models extends the government budget representation introducing
public transfers to households. However, they focus more on representing the intra-regional
structure of the government budget rather than considering its inter-regional structure. Models
belonging to this category comprehend LINKAGE (van der Mensbrugghe, 2011), ENV-Linkages
(Chateau et al., 2014), and ENVISAGE (van der Mensbrugghe, 2008). Most global CGE models
addressing the issues of climate change and environment enters this second group of models
(GEM-E3, Capros et al., 2013; and GTEM, Pant, 2007).
In the third strand the MyGTAP database and model (Minor and Walmsley, 2013a, 2013b) assume
a wider description of the government budget, allowing for both regional and international
transfers. This model focuses on the distributive effects of policies. The regional household is split
in two distinct and independent agents, namely the private household and the government and
both consume and save a fraction of their income according to a Cobb-Douglas function.
4

3. Creating a consistent augmented GTAP database
The structure of a GTAP Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is illustrated by means of a representative
SAM for one region in Table 1. The GTAP database is a series of regional SAMs linked each other via
a detailed representation of the international trade in goods and services. In general terms, its
structure follows the conventions of the System of National Accounts (UN, 1993) and the basic
SAM principles (Pyatt and Round, 1977; Pyatt and Round, 1985; Pyatt, 1991).
This section builds on the description of a SAM by McDonald and Thierfelder (2004) and highlights
the modifications made in order to include a more detailed the public sector. The representative
SAM summarizes six groups of demanding agents: productive activities, private representative
households, government, investment, global transport services (or margins) and other regions
(international trade). These transactions take place at market prices following GTAP terminology
(sellers’ prices). Furthermore, associated with each purchase there is an additional payment to the
government that represents sales taxes (defined as the difference between market and agent
prices). The SAM shows that for imported commodities sellers’ prices are the sum of the world
price paid to the exporter, the per unit transport cost, and the per unit tariff rate (Mcomm column 1 in Table 1). In terms of domestically produced commodities, sellers’ prices are the
(producer) prices received by domestic activities. This means that export taxes are considered as
expenditures by the domestic commodity accounts (Dcomm - column 2). Domestic producer
prices derive from the production costs, composed of the costs of intermediate inputs (at sellers’
prices), payments to primary inputs, as well as taxes.3 Income accrues first the regional household
and then is distributed among the private household, the government and the capital account
(column 5). Ultimately, the regional household provides a method by which the limitations
imposed by lack of data on intra-institutional transactions can be partially bypassed (Hertel,
1997).4 Regional income (cell L5) is composed of payments to factors (net of factor income taxes)
and depreciation, plus total net indirect tax revenues (trade, sales, factor use and production
taxes), and income taxes (row E). While both the private household and the government obtain
income from the regional household, the capital account has two sources of income: depreciation
and the balance on the capital account of the balance of payments. Therefore, there are no
records of transactions between private households and the government or the capital account;
nor between the government and the capital account. The formulation of a regional household
implies that the private household does not pay income taxes nor does it save directly. Similarly,
the government neither saves nor borrows meaning that there is an implicit balance on the
government budget equal to zero.
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All taxes producers must pay, namely: taxes on intermediate uses, taxes on primary factor uses, and output taxes is
summarised in Table 1 cell I2.
4
This method limits how the model is built; since it implies imposing a particular vision about the distribution of
domestic consumption expenditure (see section 4 for further details).
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International trade is considered with two elements: a) expenditures on commodities (column 11)
and b) expenditures on transport margins (column 10). The value of exports is free on board (FOB)
after paying export duties. Exports of transport services that are part of the global transport pool
are separately recorded. Imports of commodities consider also FOB prices, with transport services
taken into account separately as well. Their sum represents expenditure on imports including cost,
insurance and freight (CIF). The implications of this formulation is that there are two sets of trade
balances: i) one representing the trade balance with respect to each of the transport services (cell
H10) and ii) one recording the trade balance with respect to each region (cell H11).
To extend the database and account for an explicit government with its own budget, the crucial
aspect is the regional household assumption. Following Table 1, the regional household earns
income from factor and taxes (row E), then the endowment of primary factors becomes:
∑

(1)

Total tax revenue is:
∑ ∑
∑

∑ ∑

∑

∑

∑

∑

(2)

Therefore, in the representative region total income by sources is:
∑

(3)

It must be equal to the definition of regional income by destinations:
(4)

where:

∑

∑

∑

(5)

∑

∑

∑

(6)

Finally, the regional household choice affects the Saving-Investment macroeconomic balance that
becomes:
∑ ∑
∑ ∑

∑ ∑

∑ ∑
∑

∑
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∑ ∑
(7)

Table 1: An archetypal GTAP SAM

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Mcomm

Dcomm

Act

Fact

REG

Phhd

Govt

Inv

Tax

Trade margins

ROW

Totals

VIFMi,j,r

VIPMi,r

VIGMi,r

VIIMi,s,r

VDFMi,j,r

VDPMi,r

VDGMi,r

VDIMi,r

Mcomm
Dcomm
Act

VFMf,i,r
HFf,r

Govt
Inv

Totals

VDEPr
MTAXi,s,r

XTAXi,r,s

TVOMi,r

VFMf,i,r

Phhd

ROW

VXWDi,r,s

VOMi,j,r

REG

Trade
margins

VSTMRG,r

VOMi,j,r

Fact

Tax

VIMSi,r

PTAXi,r

TTAXr

YRr

YHr

YHr

YGr

YGr
VTWRMRG,i,s,r VSTMRG,r

SAVEr

DTAXf,r

PSTAXi,r

GSTAXi,r

VIWSi,r,s –
VTWRMRG,i,s,r
-VXWDi,r,s

ISTAXi,r

INVr
TTAXr

VTWRMRG,j,s,r

VTWRMRG,j,s,r

VIWSi,s,r

VIWSi,s,r

VIMSi,s,r

TVOMj,r

VOMi,r

VFMf,i,r

YRr

YHr

YGr

INVr

TTAXr

VTWRMRG,j,s,r

VIWSi,s,r

Legend: VIFMi,j,r: Imported intermediate commodity i in sector j in region r; VIPMi,r: Private consumption of imported commodity i in region r; VIGMi,r: Government consumption of imported commodity i in region r;
VIIMCGDS,I,r: Imported capital good in region r; VIMSi,r,s: Total imports of commodity i from region r to region s; VDFMi,j,r: Domestic intermediate commodity i in sector j in region r; VDPMi,r: Private consumption of domestic
commodity i in region r; VDGMi,r: Government consumption of domestic commodity i in region r; VDIMCGDS,I,r: Domestic capital good in region r; VXWDi,r,s: Exports of commodity i from region r to region s; TVOMi,r:
Domestic disposable supply of commodity i in region r; VOMi,r: Domestic production of commodity i in sector j in region r; VFMf,i,r: Factor f use in sector j in region r; HFf,r: Income out of factor f in region r; TTAXr: Total tax
revenue in region r; YHr: Private household income; YGr: Government income; VDEPr: Depreciation of factor f in region r; SAVEr: total regional savings in region r; INVr: Total investment in region r; MTAXi,r,s: Import
duties on imported commodity i from region r to region s; XTAXi,r: Export tax for exported commodity i from region r to region s; PTAXi,r: Production taxes (comprehensive of sales taxes paid on intermediate inputs, the
expenditure on factor use, production taxes) in sector j in region r; DTAXf,r: direct tax on factor f in region r; PSTAXi,r: Sales tax on private consumption of commodity i in region r; GSTAXr: Sales tax on Government
consumption of commodity i in region r; ISTAXi,r: Sales tax on investment of commodity i in region r; VTWRMRG,j,r,s: Trade margins on imported commodity i from region r to region s; VSTMRG,r: Trade margins on exports of
commodity i to region s; VIWSi,s,r: Imports of commodity i at world prices from region r to region s;
Sets: i, j: productive sectors and commodities; f: factors of production; r, s: regions; CGDS: capital goods; MRG: trade margins;
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The first stage to extend the database is disaggregating the regional household account for each
region, which is straightforward when data on government borrowing/saving are available.
Following this approach has two main advantages, as McDonald and Thierfelder (2004) suggest: i)
the specification of only three institutional accounts for each region, namely private household,
government and capital account when available information is limited; and ii) the identification of
transactions between these institutions. As a consequence, a more realistic representation of the
government budget is possible. In the second stage, we used IMF data on inter-regional and intraregional transactions are added to the data base; focusing on transactions that include payments
for debt interests, social transfers to households, and official transfers.
The extended SAM for a representative region is shown in Table 2. The major differences between
Table 1 and Table 2 are the elimination of the regional household account and the inclusion of an
additional account called Globe, following the GLOBE model specification (McDonald and Sonmez,
2004). The artificial notion of the Globe account is required because data on inter-regional
transfers does not provide a bilateral matrix for the transactions among regions but defines for
each region only inflows and outflows. Hence, the Globe account is an accounting artifice: its
income is the sum of all the outflows from each region and its uses are the inflows to each region.
This implies that their sum is equal at the world level by definition. However, at the regional level
inflows and outflows are not necessarily equal, and the net inflow/outflow is recorded as an
income in the region’s capital account. This is a practical solution to the lack of complete
information.
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Table 2: An archetypal extended GTAP SAM

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
L
M
N

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Mcomm

Dcomm

Act

Fact

Phhd

Govt

Inv

Tax

Trade margins

ROW

Globe

Totals

VIFMi,j,r

VIPMi,r

VIGMi,r

VIIMi,s,r

VDFMi,j,r

VDPMi,r

VDGMi,r

VDIMi,r

Mcomm
Dcomm
Act

VFMf,i,r
TRANS_GOVr+
INTDr+OEXPr

HFf,r
OINCr

Inv

MTAXi,s,r

XTAXi,r,s

PTAXi,r

TTAXr

VDEPr

SAV_HHLDr

SAV_GOVr

DTAXf,r

PSTAXi,r

GSTAXi,r

VTWRMRG,i,s,r VSTMRG,r

VIWSi,r,s –
VTWRMRG,i,s,r
VXWDi,r,s

INTFIs,r

YHr

AIDIs,r

YGr

(INTFIs,r- INTFOr,s)+
(AIDIs,r- AIDOr,s)

INVr

ISTAXi,r

TTAXr

VTWRMRG,j,s,r

VTWRMRG,j,s,r

VIWSi,s,r

VIWSi,s,r
AIDOr,s+
INTFOr,s

Globe
Totals

TVOMi,r

VFMf,i,r

Govt

ROW

VXWDi,r,s

VOMi,j,r

Phhd

Trade
margins

VSTMRG,r

VOMi,j,r

Fact

Tax

VIMSi,r

VIMSi,s,r

TVOMj,r

VOMi,j,r

VFMf,i,r

YHr

AIDOr,s+
INTFOr,s

YGr

INVr

TTAXr

VTWRMRG,j,s,r

VIWSi,s,r

AIDOr,s+ INTFOr,s

Legend: VIFMi,j,r: Imported intermediate commodity i in sector j in region r; VIPMi,r: Private consumption of imported commodity i in region r; VIGMi,r: Government consumption of imported commodity i in region r;
VIIMCGDS,r: Imported capital good in region r; VIMSi,r,s: Total imports of commodity i from region r to region s; VDFMi,j,r: Domestic intermediate commodity i in sector j in region r; VDPMi,r: Private consumption of domestic
commodity i in region r; VDGMi,r: Government consumption of domestic commodity i in region r; VDIMCGDS,r: Domestic capital good in region r; VXWDi,r,s: Exports of commodity i from region r to region s; TVOMi,r:
Domestic disposable supply of commodity i in region r; VOMi,r: Domestic production of commodity i in sector j in region r; VFMf,i,r: Factor f use in sector j in region r; HFf,r: Income out of factor f in region r; TRANS_GOVr:
Government transfers to households in region r; INTDr: Government payment of interest on debt to residents in region r; OEXPr: Government other expenditures in region r; INTFIs,r: Payment of interest on debt from
region s to region r; OINCr: Government other income in region r; TTAXr: Total tax revenue in region r; AIDIs,r: international aid inflows from region s to region r; YHr: Private household income; YGr: Government income;
VDEPr: Depreciation of factor f in region r; SAV_HHLDr : Household saving in region r; SAV_GOVr: Government savings in region r; INVr: Total investment in region r; MTAXi,r,s: Import duties on imported commodity i from
region r to region s; XTAXi,r: Export tax for exported commodity i from region r to region s; PTAXi,r: Production taxes (comprehensive of sales taxes paid on intermediate inputs, the expenditure on factor use, production
taxes) in sector j in region r; DTAXf,r: direct tax on factor f in region r; PSTAXi,r: Sales tax on private consumption of commodity i in region r; GSTAXr: Sales tax on Government consumption of commodity i in region r;
ISTAXi,r: Sales tax on investment of commodity i in region r; VTWRMRG,j,r,s: Trade margins on imported commodity i from region r to region s; VSTMRG,r: Trade margins on exports of commodity i to region s; VIWSi,s,r: Imports
of commodity i at world prices from region r to region s; AIDOr,s: International aid outflows from region r to region s; INTFOr,s: Payment of interest on debt from region r to region s.
Sets: i, j: productive sectors and commodities; f: factors of production; r, s: regions; CGDS: capital good; MRG: trade margins;
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According to table 2, we rewrite the accounting relations previously described in equations (1) to
(7). As previously stated, (3) is replaced by two distinct equations for the household and the
government, respectively equations (10) and (11). The endowment of primary factors and total tax
revenue are:
∑

(8)

∑ ∑
∑

∑ ∑

∑

∑

∑

∑

(9)

Household and government incomes by sources become:
∑

∑
∑

∑

(10)

∑
(11)

Last two relations must be equal to their respective definition by destinations. Respect to the
GTAP formulation, for each agent, final uses of income comprehend expenditures (gross of sales
tax) and saving:
∑

∑

∑

(12)

∑

∑

∑

(13)

Therefore, the distinction of agents’ savings and the introduction of inter-regional transfers modify
the Saving-Investment macroeconomic balance that becomes:
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑

∑ ∑
)

∑ ∑

∑ ∑
∑

(∑
∑

∑

)

(∑
(14)

The last modification consists of the determination of a public and private investment (GOV_INVr
and PRIV_INVr). Since in GTAP there is a single regional investment (which is a homogenous
composite of both types of investment), we split it into its components in order to define a
different rule of accumulation in the recursive dynamic version of the model. In other words, we
decompose total investments into public and private. Moreover, defining a public investment
component allows to have all the fundamental components of the public budget, and to replicate
the government net lending/borrowing for the base year. In terms of accounting rules, the model
must satisfy the Saving-Investment balance in each region, so we introduce a new accounting
identity that guarantees the sum of private and public investments that equals the total regional.

∑ ∑

∑

∑
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(15)

In addition to the GTAP database, we used data from IMF Country Reports for the years between
2005 and 2008, especially tables on Balance of Payment and General Government Operation
Statements (IMF, 2008/2011). Finally, we consider Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from the IMF
World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2014)
Extending this framework requires external sources to evaluate the new entries of the SAM as in
Table 2. As already said, the GTAP database is composed of interlinked SAMs, one for each country.
For instance, each change in taxes for a country has a subsequent effect on the other SAMs. Thus,
to avoid unbalancing the whole structure of the database we mainly focus on the introduction of
different types of transfers, considering both intra-regional and inter-regional transfers. Intraregional transfers consist of social transfers and benefits from the government to the private
household, while inter-regional transfers count for inflows and outflows of foreign aid and interest
payments on debt.
While intra-regional transfers reflect the official percentage respect to GDP of the IMF Country
reports, foreign aids and interest payments require simplifying assumptions. From an accounting
point of view, the global flow of foreign aid among countries must be equal to zero, since the total
amount of outflows must match the total amount of inflows. Because data has been collected
from different sources, the world sum for inflows and outflows was not always zero, as required
by the accounting rule. In those cases, we assume the global value of outflows as the most
realistic, and we apply regional shares to distribute inflows according to IMF country reports.
Similar simplifying assumptions have been applied to interest payments. From IMF Country
reports we derive the total interest payments as a percentage of GDP. In many cases, especially
developing countries, there is the distinction between payments to residents and non-residents.
When the information is not available, we suppose that the distinction between domestic and
foreign debt is a good approximation of interest payments. It is reasonable to assume that if a
region has a higher fraction of domestic debt respect to total debt, then it will pay a higher
amount of interests to residents instead of non-residents.
As in the case of foreign aid, the global amount of payments to non-residents must be equal to the
global amount of payments to residents from abroad. However, this information is often missing.
To allocate the global amount among countries we consider the percentage composition of
Investment Income by region according to the balance of payments. Then, we portion the world
total outflows of interest payments according to the regional share of investment income. We are
aware that this procedure may not be the best alternative, but considering the lack of data on
bilateral flows of interest payments, we assume that they are paid proportionally to the total
credits from investment income.
As previously mentioned we do not want to unbalance the whole structure of the GTAP database,
and at the same time we consider the fact that there is an incomplete coverage of countries
taxation. Therefore, we introduce two balancing items: other income and other expenditures,
which have not any real counterpart in the official statistics but they are useful to replicate exactly
the recurrent account deficit/surplus of IMF official data.

11

4. The within- period specification
Once the benchmark year database has been extended, it is possible to improve the theoretical
formulation of the ICES model. In this section we present the mathematical statements for the
demand side system only, since the rest of the model remains unchanged. In the extended model,
and according to the new SAM, the different agents borrow from each other and receive transfers
as well. It is important to highlight that only government receives both domestic and foreign
transfers. This means we must introduce transfers within and between regions, as well as interest
payments (see section 5 for the definition of the rule). In the following description Greek letters
represent fixed shares, while variables with a bar denote the benchmark year value of the variable
itself.
Let us start from the private household in region r. Private income is modified to consider the new
income sources (equation 16). All new income sources are defined in equations (17)-(20).
Transfers are fixed shares of the income of the agent paying out the transfer. For instance, social
transfers from government to the private household are a fixed share (
) of the government
income. Similarly, other expenditures and other income (the balancing items of the new SAM) are
respectively fixed shares of government and household income (according to shares
and
). Interest income to households is the sum of interest paid from the domestic government
and interest from abroad.
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
As in the GTAP model, the aggregate regional private consumption and savings are fixed shares
(
) of the private income level, while private consumption is the sum of the single
commodity consumption, where PPr and PPRIVr are prices and QPr and QPRIVr quantities,
respectively.
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)

∑

Private investment is a balancing item since it is computed as the difference between total
regional investment (net of depreciation) and public investments:
(25)
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The same reasoning is applied to government.
(26)
Equations (27)-(29) show the definition of the new variables.
representing the total amount
of interest paid from a government (so it is the sum of payment to residents and non-residents).
Outflows of grants (AIDO) are a fixed share of government income, multiplied by a scaling
parameter (
) which reflects the change in the global amount of grants to be allocated.
Inflows of grants (AIDI), are simply rescaled considering the initial level.
(27)
(28)
(29)

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

As already discussed in the construction of the extended SAM, there is no bilateral matrix to track
international transfers (i.e. grants), so we created an artificial accounting agent which collects all
outflows and distribute them to the countries. This leads to a clearing condition in the global
market of aid of this kind:5
∑ ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

∑ ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

(30)

Regional real government expenditures are a fixed share of real regional GDP,6 while nominal
expenditures are the sum of the single commodity consumption.
(31)
(32)
(33)

∑

Current government savings are simply the difference between net revenues and consumption of
goods and services.
(34)

5

A similar clearing condition is present in MyGTAP (Minor and Walmsley, 2013b), following the treatment of
international transfers according to McDonald and Sonmez (2004).
6
The choice of government consumption as a share of GDP follows the approach in Env-LINKAGES (Chateau et al.
2014). However, how to model expenditures is strictly connected to the public sector closure and the kind of policy to
analyse. For a detailed description of the options see section 6.
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Government investment is financed through current government savings and borrowing from
residents and non-residents.
(35)
Note that a positive value of the variable
means a deficit, thus the government is
borrowing, while a negative sign means a surplus so that the government is a lending resources.

5. The between- periods specification: debt and interests
ICES-XPS is a recursive dynamic model, thus each year is linked to the previous one via capital
accumulation. The structure of the debt accumulation for the government is close to the capital
accumulation. There is a stock from the previous simulation year (
) which is increased
by government’s borrowing in the current simulation year (
). Denoting the current
simulation year as t and the previous year as t-1, we have the following accumulation rule:

(36)
Then, we split the accumulation rule to consider the repayment of debt for domestic and foreign
households according to a fixed share
, defined as the share of foreign debt on total debt in
region r in the base year. So equation (36) becomes:
(37)
(38)
Interest payments on government’s domestic and foreign debt stocks are defined as an exogenous
interest rate ( ) multiplied by each previous year debt stock.7

(39)
(40)
Similarly to the case of international grants, there is a clearing condition also in the world market
for interest payments:
∑

∑

(41)

7

Interests’ payments of public debt suggest that the government finances its debt through public bonds. According to
Lemelin and Decaluwé (2007) “interest payments are nothing but a consequence of indebtedness: the higher the level
of indebtedness, the heavier the burden of interest payments on the government budget”.
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Moreover, each country receives an amount of interests from abroad that depends on the mean
value of the interest collected in the world market (from equation 41), and on a scaling parameter
(psavhrr) which represents the country contribution to world private investment. Since interests
are paid on previous year debt, the scaling parameter is calculated on those values:
(42)

∑

This share reflects the contribution of each country household to finance total world debt. Since
public and private savings are homogenous goods, private households lend a fraction of their
savings to governments. As a consequence, the public agent pays interests to the household. If
households save more, they could devote a higher fraction of their savings to finance public debt.
This means that at time t+1 they obtain higher interest payments.
Therefore, foreign interest inflows become:
(43)

6. The closure rule in the public sector
In each CGE model, the public sector closure defines the causality the government follows to fulfil
its budget constraint. According to Lofgren et al. (2013), this closure rule “is an important part of
the simulations in the country studies of a project”. Indeed, the choice of the closure rule is
fundamental for the subsequent analysis. To better understand the causality of each closure rule
choice, and eventually its implications in terms of a research question, we consider a simplified
setup. There is only one type of government revenue, a tax on household income (with tax rate ,
and tax base ), and the government consumes only goods and services for a total amount of CG.
Government savings (
) is the difference between revenues and expenditures.

(44)
∑

(45)
(46)

A first possible closure rule is to impose a fix tax rate, and an exogenous level of consumption. In
this case the government savings moves and adjusts according to the level of revenues. This type
of closure addresses the effect of a change in revenues on the final budget. Although the tax rate
is fixed, the total amount of revenues changes as a consequence of changes in the tax base (here
the level of household income). The assumption of fixed government consumption assumes that
there is a minimum level of expenditures in the public sector which could not be altered.
Conversely, the closure rule could impose a fixed government saving level, because, for instance,
the government may consider a certain level of borrowing as acceptable. In this case, however,
15

another variable should become endogenous to change accordingly. There are two alternatives:
either the tax rate or the level of consumption could be endogenous. The two choices represent
two alternative policy options. Whenever we consider an endogenous tax rate, we get a tax rate
level such that to maintain both the desired level of consumption and a predetermined level of
savings. Consumption adjusts to achieve the desired level of savings given a fixed tax system.
Most of the CGE models considering an explicit government agent assume the second closure rule
for public savings. They set an exogenous level of public saving and some instruments are
considered as endogenous: (i) a specific tax rate, or (ii) transfers from the government to
households. This is the case of the OECD Env-Linkages model, which assumes no changes in real
public savings because “predicting corrective government policy is not an easy task” (Chateau et
al., 2014). Conversely, the Globe model (McDonald et al., 2007) assumes in its base specification
that government savings are a residual. This ensures that all parameters controlled by government
are fixed (i.e. tax rates, quantities of goods and services consumed), consequently the only
determinants of government income and expenditures that may change are those under no direct
control of the government. Therefore, the balancing condition is that government savings is not
fixed.

7. Model tests
To test ICES- XPS, we consider two different types of exercises. Firstly, we highlight the main
advantages of using this enhanced version respect to the standard model. Secondly, we simulate a
climate policy to demonstrate how the model works along with the flexibility of the closure rule
choice in addressing different policy issues. For this purpose, we divide the world in 9 regions with
12 sectors within each region as shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Regional and sectoral aggregation
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Regions
EU
RoEurope
FSU
NorthAmerica
LACA
MENA
SSA
ASIA
Oceania

No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
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Sectors
Agriculture
Coal
Oil
Gas
Oil_Pcts
Ely_Nuclear
Ely_Renew
Ely_Other
En_Int_ind
Oth_ind_ser
Construction
Pub_Serv

a) A static comparison of ICES and ICES- XPS
For this first test, we consider two simple static experiments imposing changes only in the EU
region and compare the results of ICES without the detailed public sector and ICES-XPS, to
highlight the advantages of introducing explicitly the public sector in the analysis. First, we impose
a 5 percent cut in labour taxes, and then a 5 percent reduction in labour use tax rates across
sectors. For the ICES-XPS closure rule, we assume that government consumption is fixed at
benchmark year levels in order to isolate the effects of tax changes on public budgets. The table
below summarizes the outcomes in EU for the two models (ICES and ICES-XPS).
Table 4: Results of a 5% reduction on labour tax and labour use tax rates in EU (percentage changes)
Labour tax
Labour use tax
ICES
ICES-XPS
ICES
ICES-XPS
GDP
0
+0.1
+0.001
+0.1
Private consumption
0
+1.4
+0.01
+1.6
1
Public consumption
0
0
-0.03
0
Investments
0
-0.1
+0.01
-0.2
Exports
0
-1.5
+0.01
-1.6
Imports
0
+0.5
+0.01
+0.6
1
In ICES-XPS percentage variation of public consumption is null because of the
closure rule choice.
All variables are considered in real terms
Detail

The first two columns compare the outcomes when a reduction in labour tax is implemented. In
the standard ICES model this shock has no effect on GDP, private and public consumption,
investments nor international trade, both in nominal and in real terms. This is a direct
consequence of the “regional household” assumption. Indeed, a reduction in labour tax rate of 5
percent means a higher disposable income for the household and a contemporaneous reduction in
income tax revenue of the same amount (295 $ billion). Since consumption (both private and
public) and saving decisions are a fixed fraction of the regional income, they do not change.
Finally, this leads to no changes in investment demand and foreign trade. However, ICES-XPS
produces different results. The reduction in labour tax increases the available income for the
private household which increases its private consumption level (consistently with the CobbDouglas function). Government consumption is exogenously set to zero in real terms. Higher
imports are mainly driven by the increase in private consumption while exports decline because of
a reduction in sectoral production of energy intensive industries. The output reduction in these
sectors is caused by an increase in labour price, since they have a high share of labour in their cost
structures (66% in the base year). Investments decline slightly.
Government income reduces by -2.1% (84 $ billion), while tax revenue reduction is nearly 254 $
billion (-295 $ billion is the direct reduction in income tax while the second round effect for
indirect taxes counts for 40 $ billion). The reduction in government income is lower than the
change in total tax revenue because of the reduction in net transfers paid to other agents (-170 $
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billion). Because of the closure rule, public expenditures in goods and services and in investments
move according to their prices.8 Therefore they rise in nominal terms by 0.56% (+19 $ billion) and
0.52% (+3 $ billion) respectively. The final net effect is an increase in public deficit by +55.9% (107
$ billion). As explained in section 5, saving is a homogenous good at the regional level; this means
that the higher public deficit is compensated by regional public savings which partially close the
gap. Investment demand is determined by two elements: the differential in country and world rate
of returns to capital and GDP growth rates. Furthermore, the former is affected by the regional
saving price level which in turns depends on the available regional savings. Finally, government
debt stock increases of the same amount of the post- simulation deficit, which means a 1.1%
growth.
Columns 3 and 4 summarises the results of a 5 percent drop in labour use tax rates in all sectors
showing the differences between models. For ICES, GDP growth is negligible. The tax cut not only
stimulates exports given lower domestic production costs, but also slightly increases imports and
investments. In absolute terms, the increase in exports is higher than the effect on import. The
increase in investments is a combination of three elements: (i) the positive sign in GDP growth, (ii)
the lower savings price level, (iii) the higher differential in rates of return of capital in the region
and at the world level.
Because of the regional household assumption, private consumption and government
consumption in nominal terms grow at the same rate, although in real terms private consumption
slightly increases while public consumption declines. It depends on the composition of
expenditures in the base year. Private household consumption has a higher level of domestic
expenditures which lowers because of the tax cut (especially in the agricultural sector); public
government, instead, has a differentiated consumption basket where goods with higher prices are
a higher fraction (the most evident price reduction is in the domestic agricultural commodities
which counts only for 0.002 percent of total government domestic consumption in the base year).
In the case of ICES-XPS, the decline in labour use tax slightly stimulates the production in labour
intensive sectors with high tax rates. As a consequence, there is an increase in GDP. Then, lower
production costs due to lower labour taxation, reduce market prices for commodities and
stimulates final uses, mainly private consumption. Total tax revenue declines by 340 $ billion. The
direct effect of the tax cut is a loss of 456 $ billion for factor use tax, while the induced changes in
other revenues count for additional 108 $ billion in direct taxation revenue and 7 $ billion in the
other indirect taxes. Government income declines by 3.4% (-136 $ billion) because there is a
reduction in expenditures for net transfers (-205 $ billion). Public expenditures and investments
are unchanged. This causes the growth in government deficit (+61.7% or 118.7 $ billion) and the

8

As mentioned at the beginning of the section, the definition of the closure rule for the public sector is considered in
real terms. Ultimately, this means that public expenditure moves according to price changes while its quantity is fixed
at the base year level. This is coherent with the definition of the budget of the government, whose elements
(including expenditures) are defined in nominal terms. Moreover, final indicators of the public sector, such as deficit
and debt levels are in nominal terms as well.
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consequent rise in debt stock (+1.2%). The increase in government deficit reduces the available
regional savings and this has negative effects on investments. This effect is emphasized by the high
saving price level which reduces the differential between regional and global rate of return for
capital. The final effect on investment is quite reduced because of the positive effect of GDP
growth in the investment allocation of the Global Bank.
The two models give similar results in terms of GDP and production, but they differ in terms of
trade balance and investment demand. This is a consequence of the elimination of the regional
household assumption. Although in ICES-XPS considers saving as a homogenous good, it deems
private and public saving as perfect substitutes, so these two variables are outcomes of
differentiated choices. This means that the final level of regional saving is no longer equal to the
ICES standard model. Moreover, in the ICES standard model savings are completely exogenous and
a fixed fraction of regional income, in the ICES-XPS model this is no longer the rule: we have in its
basic closure an endogenous government saving level while households’ savings are as usual
fraction of their own income. To close the gap in the saving- investment balance the trade balance
moves accordingly.
The introduction of an autonomous government and the elimination of the regional household
assumption in ICES-XPS allow us to analyse changes in direct taxation, which in ICES are not
captured because of netting out effects on household and government income that are
aggregated as regional income. Moreover, extending the public sector allows us to show effects
on the international allocation of investment related to the public indebtedness level.

b) A dynamic experiment: the effects of a carbon tax with different closures for the public sector
In this case we simulate a carbon tax in a dynamic recursive setup. The aim is to analyse the
effects on fiscal variables (i.e. tax revenues, public consumption, government borrowing and debt
accumulation) and on the economy as a whole (GDP and its macro components), following two
different closure rules.
We use as a reference case the SSP2 scenario considering the corresponding population and GDP
growth. The time horizon is 2007-2030. The World is aggregated in 9 macro regions as already
shown in Table 3. The carbon tax is applied only in the EU and the following results will focus only
in this region.
We compare our results with five studies about GDP effects of a carbon tax (Bohringer et al., 2009;
Bosello et al., 2013; Durand-Lasserve et al., 2010; Orecchia and Parrado, 2013; Peterson et al.,
2011). These studies consider a 20% reduction in emissions in EU27 and they estimate an effect on
GDP ranging from +0.1% to -2% in 2020 with a carbon price ranging from 19 €/tCO2 to 70 €/tCO2.
In this exercise we assume a value of 54 $/tCO2 (40 €/tCO2) in 2020 and 95 $/tCO2 (70 €/tCO2) in
2030. Regarding the public sector, we first assume that all the parameters the government could
control are fixed and that its borrowing is a residual, thus, it adjusts according to the difference
between revenues and outlays. The research question in this case aims at quantifying the positive
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effect of a implementing a new (carbon) tax on public borrowing and public deficits. Then,
following different closure rules for the public sector it is possible explore how the carbon tax
revenues could be recycled to lower other distortionary taxes assuming a revenue neutral policy
to fulfil a target on public deficit.
To answer this question, we compare a baseline scenario, which is a reference scenario of how the
economic system grows, with a scenario where the carbon tax is imposed (CTAX scenario) and
then with a scenario where the carbon tax is used to lower distortionary burdens of labour tax
(CTAX-recycle scenario). Table 5 summarises the main findings for EU comparing the baseline with
the alternatives.
Table 5: Effects of two carbon tax scenarios on EU in 2030 (% changes with respect to baseline)
Macroeconomic data
GDP
Investments
Private consumption
Public consumption
Exports
Imports
1

1

CTAX scenario
-1.25
-1.65
-2.31
0
-2.50
-1.32

CTAX-recycle scenario
-1.32
-2.42
-1.18
0
-2.29
-2.62

Macroeconomic data are provided in real terms

The reduction of GDP due to the carbon tax is within the range of the five studies cited previously.
The economy is affected by a price effect. Pollutant commodities face a higher final price in the
market. This affects both the production and the consumption side. From a producing point of
view, fossil fuel commodities are more expensive as intermediates, thus all sectors reduce their
demand. Therefore, polluting sectors lower their production. Final consumers face a higher market
price so that they also reduce their consumption. This is one of the basic features of the carbon tax
itself: it changes consumption behaviour in the economy. Exports and imports decline because of
a contemporaneous reduction in total regional production and final demand.
The net effect on investment is negative because the negative effect on GDP prevails over the
positive effect on the differential between regional and world rates of return of capital. Indeed,
raising a carbon tax with endogenous government deficit allows the government to increase its
income and lower the deficit level. Consequently, regional savings are higher than in the reference
scenario. Increasing regional savings lower the price of saving also lowering the regional rate of
return of capital.
Another crucial element to analyse is how tax revenue changes over time considering the base
erosion principle. Figure 1 shows the tax revenue decomposition in its three main componentsdirect, indirect and carbon tax revenues in 2010, 2020 and 2030.
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Figure 1: Composition of total tax revenue ($ billion)
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When the carbon tax is implemented, tax revenues increase along the time period. However total
tax revenues increase less than the carbon tax revenue. Indeed, this tax has a negative
consequence since it erodes its tax base. Comparing variations on total tax revenue and the
carbon tax revenues, the total increase in tax is lower than the carbon tax revenue as Figure 2
depicts. In other words, in 2010 nearly 42% of carbon tax revenue is eroded by other tax revenue
drop; the percentage erosion increases to 52% in 2030.

Figure 2: Comparison of total tax revenue changes and carbon tax revenue ($ billion)
400
300
200
100
0
2010

2020

Total tax revenue differential between baseline and CTAX scenario

2030
Carbon tax revenue

To better understand the causes of this phenomenon, we decompose indirect tax revenues to
highlight which taxes changes as a consequence of the new carbon tax (see Figure 3). The main
changes affect three producer taxes (tax on output, factor use and intermediate use) and the
private consumption tax.
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Figure 3: Changes in selected tax revenue ($ billion)
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The factor use tax drop is caused by the reduction in production of the polluting commodities
which has to pay a higher output tax on final products and in the substitution in the nest energycapital. This tax does not decline uniformly among producing factors but the highest reduction is
in the labour and capital use taxation. In 2030 their reductions respect to the same year in the
baseline scenario count for 48% and 45%, respectively. Finally, this tax counts for 23% in total
indirect revenues reduction. The output tax reduction is limited to the fossil fuel sectors (coal, oil,
gas and oil products) which count for 65% of the output tax reduction, while the energy intensive
industry, other industry and services, and construction sectors account for the remaining 35%. The
output tax is the smallest contributor respect to the other indirect tax revenue falls, counting for
only 19%. The intermediate use tax diminishes because of the reduction in fossil fuel
intermediates use due to their higher prices. Its relative weight in total indirect taxation revenue is
nearly the same of the factor use tax drop (22%), suggesting a clear link between the two tax
performances. Finally, private consumption tax revenue drastically reduces because of the tax
base erosion of the carbon tax. The sole reduction in this tax revenue counts for 35% on the total
change in the CTAX scenario in 2030 compared with the same year in the baseline scenario.
Results on tax revenue after the introduction of the carbon tax do not contradict Böhringer and
Rutherford (2013). They suggest an interaction effect of raising a new tax in a distorted tax system
which exacerbates the negative interactions in the economy.
As already described, carbon tax revenues lower the deficit level and the borrowing needs of the
government (see Figure 4). In the CTAX scenario public deficit is lower than in the reference
scenario by 21% (or 109 $ billions) in 2030.
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Figure 4: public deficit evolution in the period 2008/2030 ($ billion)
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Therefore, the government debt accumulation is lower in the CTAX scenario than in the reference
case (see Figure 5). In 2030 public debt reduces by 7.5% respect to the reference scenario (1319 $
bllions). The slope of the government debt accumulation in the baseline scenario is steeper than in
the counterfactual.
Figure 5: public debt accumulation in the period 2008/2030 ($ billion)
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Since in ICES-XPS the government closure is relevant, it is also important to see what happens with
the same carbon tax but considering a different closure rule. Here, we assume that the
government targets its deficit level fixing it as in the baseline scenario. So the carbon tax revenue
is not used to lower public deficit but to alleviate distortionary taxation in the economy, such as
the labour income tax. In this case results are not so different respect to the previous one. The
economy faces a decline in GDP growth mainly caused by a more evident reduction in investment
demand. Private consumption increase respect to the previous experiment because of the higher
level of disposable income for the private household. Figure 6 depicts the composition of total tax
revenue and its breakdown in its main components. In the CTAX- recycling scheme total tax
revenue decreases by 59 $ billion in 2010 and by 399 $ billion in 2030.
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Figure 6: Composition of total tax revenue in the baseline and CTAX recycling scenarios ($ billion)
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This scenario shows the same effect on final tax revenues but with a more evident reduction in
direct taxation than in the indirect tax rate because of the recycling scheme. In fact, the share of
carbon tax eroded by indirect tax revenue reduction ranges between 21% in 2010 and 32% in
2030. Comparing the CTAX scenario and the CTAX-recycling scenario there is a different pattern in
indirect tax revenues. The decline in intermediate uses and output taxes is equal in both scenarios,
since they are solely a consequence of the carbon tax introduction. Conversely, private
consumption tax and factor use tax are higher than in the previous exercise. Table 6 below
compares the changes in indirect tax revenues in the two counterfactuals respect to the baseline
scenario.

Table 6: Changes in indirect tax revenues in CTAX and CTAX-recycling scenarios respect to baseline scenario ($
billion)
2010
Factor use tax revenue
Output tax revenue
Export subsidies
Import duties
Intermediate uses tax revenue
Private consumption tax revenue
Public consumption tax revenue

-2
-2
0
0
-3
-3
0

CTAX scenario
2020
-10
-12
0
0
-15
-13
0

2030
-20
-23
0
0
-27
-23
0

CTAX- recycling scenario
2010
2020
2030
-3
-15
-27
-2
-12
-23
0
0
0
0
0
-1
-3
-15
-27
-6
-24
-41
0
0
0

Overall, the reduction in indirect tax inlays in the CTAX recycling scenario ranges between 64.5%
and 78.6% of CTAX scenario. In this last exercise total carbon tax revenues are used to compensate
the reduction in labour income tax rate and this demonstrates the final effect on total tax
revenue. Considering only income tax, its revenues decline more than the carbon tax revenue.
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Although the drop in labour income tax counts for 94.5% of total income tax decline, there is a
slight decrease in capital income tax and taxes from fossil fuels’ natural resources as well. The
recycling scheme allows the government to lower the labour income tax rate from 35% to 28%.
Because of the closure rule, both public deficits and debt stocks are equal to the baseline scenario.

8. Conclusions
This paper describes an extended version of the ICES model, the ICES-XPS model with an improved
description of the public sector. After reviewing literature on different approaches to incorporate
a public sector in CGE models, we present both the base data and the equations of the ICES-XPS.
The base data requires including a detailed public budget with additional outlays and receipts.
Satellite statistics and other external sources are necessary for this. The mathematical statement
of the model is provided with a description of the flexibility in public sector closures. The
extension of the implies different stages: (i) the elimination of the regional household assumption,
(ii) the introduction of an enhanced public budget with intra- and inter- regional transactions
involving the government, and (iii) the definition of the yearly deficit and accumulation of
government debt stock.
Finally to test the extended ICES-XPS model, we run some illustrative numerical examples. Firstly,
in a static framework we highlight the advantages of the enhanced version respect to the standard
model. The outcomes of ICES-XPS show that this version allows the possibility to analyse the
effects of changes in direct taxation, as a consequence of the elimination of the assumption of the
representative regional household. The reduction in labour use tax rate in both model versions
shows results with the same sign in terms of GDP and private consumption, while they differ in
terms of investment and trade balance. This is a consequence of the changes in the savinginvestment balance because of the introduction of government savings and private savings as
outcomes of different behaving agents.
Finally, in a recursive dynamic framework, we compare a climate policy following two different
closure rules to analyse the flexibility of ICES-XPS. Both experiments show results close to existing
studies about the GDP costs of implementing a carbon tax. The experiments show that within the
same model and framework it is possible to consider a carbon tax either as an instrument to lower
the burden of public deficit or as additional revenues to subsidise labour income.
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